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Introduction
For many, detention operations in Iraq will be forever linked with the criminalabuses that occurred in Abu Ghraib.1 The ensuing efforts to assign personal
responsibility to those involved satisfied some proportion of the public and left
others demanding more. As the story eventually faded from the front pages, public
interest in detention operations in Iraq faded as well, and many could be forgiven
the assumption that such operations had all but ended in the wake of Abu Ghraib.
Yet detention operations did not end in Iraq. Indeed, they expanded well be-
yond the scope that many believed possible earlier. At their height in late 2007, co-
alition forces2 were detaining in excess of 26,000 persons within Iraq. But like the
dog that didn’t bark, the later operations failed to attract any significant notice, de-
spite their extensive nature. This article will attempt to shed some light on subse-
quent detention operations conducted by the coalition forces, focusing on those
aspects associated with the legal authorities to detain and release detainees.
Part I will discuss the legal background against which detention of persons is
authorized during conflicts and other operations. Part II will describe in some de-
tail the command structure of the operation and the applicable regulatory guid-
ance, and then will explain the various review processes by which detainees were
initially interned and then eventually released. Because the author’s experience in
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detention operations was in 2007 and 2008, the processes discussed will necessarily
be limited to that time period. This need not be a significant liability, as that period
offered both already-developed and innovative processes that deserve study, and
potential emulation in similar situations in the future, with which Part III will be
mostly concerned.
Part I—The Law
The detention operation with which this article is primarily concerned is that under
the auspices of relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The au-
thorities granted there did not arise in a vacuum, however, and the international laws
applicable to earlier phases of the operations in Iraq still retained some degree of
authority. Accordingly, a review of those applicable laws will be presented.
A. Combat Operations
Following the initiation of combat operations3 on March 20, 2003,4 Common Arti-
cle 2 of the Geneva Conventions5 was triggered, and therefore all the provisions of
the Conventions applied to operations that followed. In addition, the jus in bello
provisions relating to targeting of persons on the battlefield6 were also applicable.
Accordingly, combat forces were permitted to use lethal force against combatants,
and required to refrain from the use of force against non-combatants. Persons cap-
tured on the battlefield would be assessed to fall into one of several categories, and
their subsequent treatments depended on the applicable categories.
Combatants would normally be considered prisoners of war. Article 4 of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (PW Conven-
tion) sets out the criteria for prisoner of war status, the predominant categories be-
ing members of the enemy’s armed forces and members of organized militias who
are under responsible command, wearing a distinctive sign, carrying their arms
openly, and observing the law of war.7 Assuming the person fits into one of these
categories, he is immediately treated as a prisoner of war in accordance with the re-
mainder of the PW Convention, and he is detained for the remainder of the con-
flict.8 The detaining power is under no obligation to review the status of the
prisoner of war nor to release him until after the cessation of hostilities.
If there is doubt about the detained person’s status as a prisoner of war, the de-
taining power shall convene a tribunal to make the determination in accordance
with Article 5 of the PW Convention.9 Article 5 provides very little guidance as to
the nature of the tribunal; the practice of the United States is to set up an adminis-
trative panel of three officers to hear the evidence, with no involvement of counsel
for the person in question.10 The charter of the Article 5 tribunal is a limited one:
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does the person whose case is before it (there is no requirement that the person be
physically present before the tribunal) meet one of the criteria of Article 4? The tri-
bunal need not determine that the person is a lawful combatant, though it will
likely do so in making a determination of status. The text of Article 5 supports this
conclusion, beginning, “Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having com-
mitted a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy . . . .”11 This
verbal formulation indicates that it is, by this point, a given the person has commit-
ted a belligerent act, though who has made that determination is nowhere stated.
The Article 5 tribunal, therefore, does not determine whether the person’s deten-
tion will continue, but merely decides whether the provisions of the PW Conven-
tion will apply to that detention. Another implication is that the drafters may have
thought that doubt would only arise in the case of a potential illegal combatant, for
in the other categories—for example, the armed forces—it is not necessary that the
service member ever commit a belligerent act to receive prisoner of war protection.
Should the person be determined not to be a prisoner of war, the next step in the
legal analysis is one of some controversy, brought into prominence by the decision
of the United States to detain persons in Guantanamo. That decision is not the fo-
cus of this article, so the respective positions will merely be summarized. The US
position is that there is a gap in coverage between the PW Convention and the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Civilians Convention), into which persons characterized variously as illegal com-
batants, unprivileged belligerents, or, as used in Guantanamo, enemy combatants
fall. Customary international law permits the detention of all combatants, legal or
illegal, for the pendency of the conflict. The characterization of a combatant as “il-
legal” renders him liable for prosecution without the benefit of combatant immu-
nity, while also depriving him of protection under the PW Convention. The
contrary position is that there are no gaps between the 1949 Conventions, and that
a detained person who does not benefit under the PW Convention must necessar-
ily benefit from the Civilians Convention.
Assuming the “no-gaps” position as a matter of convenience of discussion, the
detaining power next turns to the Civilians Convention to determine whether
detention is available. The first issue is whether the person is a “protected person”
under Article 4 of the Civilians Convention.12 In short, Article 4 declares all non-
national (of the detaining power) civilians to be protected persons, then excepts
certain subclasses from that protection.13 Non-protected persons benefit only
from the general protections set forth in Part II of the Civilians Convention,14 and
from the general standards of humane treatment contained in Common Arti-
cle 3.15 Protected persons benefit from the more substantive protections contained
in Part III of the Civilians Convention. In the context of detention, the legal
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analysis depends on where the protected person is being detained, though the prac-
tical effect between the two is not great.
Part III of the Civilians Convention is entitled “Status and Treatment of Pro-
tected Persons.” The first section is entitled “Provisions Common to the Territo-
ries of the Parties to the Conflict and to Occupied Territories.” This section
provides protections that, while more specific than those set out in Common Arti-
cle 3, are not appreciably greater.16 The next two sections are split in their coverage
between that afforded to protected persons in the home territory of the detaining
power and those who are detained in occupied territory.17 As regards the power to
detain protected persons, the applicable articles provide similar, though not identi-
cal, protections and procedures.
Article 41, which applies to protected persons in the detaining power’s home
territory, permits internment or assigned residence18 of protected persons if “other
methods of control mentioned in the present Convention [are] inadequate.”19 Ar-
ticle 42 goes on to provide that internment may only be ordered “if the security of
the detaining power makes it absolutely necessary.”20 Article 43 provides for re-
views of the initial decision to order internment, with reconsideration of the deci-
sion occurring “as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative
board,” and a further review accruing twice yearly.21
In occupied territories, all the provisions related to internment are in a single ar-
ticle, Article 78. There is a slightly different standard from that espoused in Article
42; under Article 78, internment is possible “for imperative reasons of security.”22
Unlike Article 42, which is silent on the procedures by which the detaining power
makes the initial determination to intern, Article 78 provides that such a decision
must be made “according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying
Power.”23 The Article 43 “reconsideration” is in Article 78 restyled as an “appeal,”
to be decided “with the least possible delay.”24 Further review of continued intern-
ment is to be “if possible every six months,”25 which is probably a better formula-
tion that the “twice yearly” formulation in Article 43. This section of Article 78
concludes with the requirement that the review be by a “competent body”26 set up
by the detaining power, which is much less rigorous than the court suggested by
Article 43, though maybe about the same as the administrative board option also
provided in Article 43.
B. Occupation Phase
President Bush announced the end of combat operations on May 1, 2003.27 This
date marks the beginning of the occupation phase in Iraq. Common Article 2 re-
mained applicable at this time,28 and the Geneva Conventions therefore continued
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in full applicability as a matter of law. Accordingly, the legal authorities to detain
civilians were unchanged during this period.
Shortly after the occupation began, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
was established to function as the interim government of Iraq.29 The CPA issued
various orders codifying some of the procedures affecting detention operations.
These will be discussed in some detail later. It is necessary to note now, however,
that the CPA pronounced that its orders and regulations would remain binding
Iraqi law after the dissolution of the CPA.30 This is important because some of the
procedures used in later detention operations continued to trace their authority
from CPA issuances, as the Iraqis had neither rescinded nor repealed them.
With the imminent standing up of the new Iraqi government, the United Nations
Security Council provided a different legal authority for continued combat and de-
tention operations, apart from the previously explicit reliance on Geneva Conven-
tions rules related to international armed conflict or occupation.
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 154631 was passed on
June 8, 2004, in anticipation of Iraqi resumption of sovereignty on June 30, 2004. It
is explicitly a Chapter VII32 resolution by which the Security Council acts in its
mandatory, international law–making role. For present purposes, paragraph 10
contains the following, where the Security Council
[d]ecides that the multinational force[33] shall have the authority to take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in
accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi
request for the continued presence of the multinational force and setting out its
tasks . . . .34
Two letters are annexed to the resolution. The first was from the Prime Minister
of the Interim Government of Iraq, Dr. Allawi, in which he wrote:
Until we are able to provide security for ourselves, including the defense of Iraq’s land,
sea and air space, we ask for the support of the Security Council and the international
community in this endeavour. We seek a new resolution on the Multinational Force
(MNF) mandate to contribute to maintaining security in Iraq, including through the
tasks and arrangements set out in the letter from Secretary of State Colin Powell to the
President of the United Nations Security Council.35
Secretary Powell’s letter contains the critical language:
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Under the agreed arrangement, the MNF stands ready to continue to undertake a
broad range of tasks to contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure force
protection. These include activities necessary to counter ongoing security threats posed
by forces seeking to influence Iraq’s political future through violence. This will include
combat operations against members of these groups, internment where this is necessary
for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons
that threaten Iraqi security.36
UNSCR 1546 therefore authorized internment for imperative reasons of security,
and while it may have been preferable to have had such language in the resolution
proper,37 it nevertheless included the authorization through this internal chain of
references. The authority to intern was not dependent on any other international law
authorities; that is, with the resumption of Iraqi sovereignty it was recognized that
that the occupation, and the ability to intern through Article 78, had ended. Rather,
this is an example of the Security Council making binding international law.
By its terms, UNSCR 1546 was to expire at the conclusion of the process of
forming an Iraqi government;38 prior to the national voting that took place on De-
cember 15, 2005, the Security Council acted again in UNSCR 163739 to extend the
mandate until December 31, 2006. UNSCR 172340 extended it yet again to Decem-
ber 31, 2007, and UNSCR 179041 further extended it to December 31, 2008. In each
of these subsequent resolutions no explicit reference was made to combat opera-
tions or internment. Rather, each reaffirmed the authorizations contained in
UNSCR 1546, which itself contained the combat and internment authorizations.
Returning to the authorization for internment, the language chosen for Secre-
tary Powell’s letter—internment for imperative reasons of security—appears to be
taken directly from Article 78 of the Civilians Convention as the closest legal anal-
ogy. Whether that was objectively true or not, and whether it was the intention of
the Security Council, it was Article 78 and associated articles to which coalition
forces looked in designing the operation to be later described.
D. Post-mandate Authority
Prior to the Security Council action in UNSCR 1790,42 it was already recognized
that the UN mandate would end after December 31, 2008.43 After long negotia-
tions throughout 2008, two agreements were signed on November 17, 2008.44 The
Strategic Framework Agreement45 set forth a number of aspirational principles to
guide future relationships between the United States and Iraq. The Security Agree-
ment46 sets forth the rules to be followed by US forces beginning on January 1,
2009. Very decidedly, the broad mandate of the UNSCR era had ended. In regard to
detention operations, the Security Agreement moved away from the “imperative
threat” administrative internment model to one that is based on criminal
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detention overseen by the Iraqi judiciary.47 Those detainees whose detentions
predated January 1, 2009 (i.e., those who had been detained under authority of
the Security Council resolutions) are to be released “in a safe and orderly manner”
unless the Iraqis are able to charge them criminally, in which case the Iraqis will as-
sume custody.48
Part II—Description of Detention Operations
A. Structure
In this section, the practical application of the law, such as it was, to actual deten-
tion operations will be described. It will begin with a short explanation of the com-
mand relationships as they existed at the time. Although such details usually appeal
only to military professionals, a familiarity with the various units and officials will
help in understanding the interplay of the various procedures used in detention
operations in Iraq.
The combatant commander with responsibility for Iraq is the Commander, US
Central Command,49 headquartered in Tampa, Florida. Central Command issued
numerous orders containing policies and guidance that were utilized in detention
operations.
The senior coalition force commander in Iraq was designated as Commander,
Multi-National Forces–Iraq, often abbreviated as MNF-I. The commander has
always been a US Army four-star general; the commanders during the period to be
discussed below were Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno.50 The rele-
vant major subordinate commanders to MNF-I were Multi-National Corps–Iraq, or
MNC-I, and the Deputy Commanding General for Detention Operations (DCG-
DO), who was also designated as the Commander, Task Force 134 (TF 134).51
MNC-I, commanded by a three-star Army general, contained all of the operating
forces in Iraq. Iraq was divided by MNC-I into subregions, each of which was com-
manded by a two-star general.52 Though the boundaries between them changed,
there were, during the times relevant for this article, six subregions, designated as
Multi-National Divisions–North, Baghdad, and Central, and Multi-National Force–
West,53 all of which were US commands; any detainees from these units would go
into US detention. The remaining regions were Multi-National Division–Center-
South, comprising a small region commanded by the Polish, and Multi-National
Force–Southeast, most notably containing Basra, commanded by the British.54
Few detainees were taken in Multi-National Division–Center-South, though
they would eventually wind up in US detention facilities. The British ran their
own detention facilities.
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The position of the Deputy Commanding General for Detention Operations
was an unusual one. As a result of the abuses uncovered at Abu Ghraib,55 the DCG-
DO was established as a two-star general position, reporting directly to the Com-
mander, MNF-I. The DCG-DO was responsible for setting and implementing de-
tention policy throughout Iraq. Anomalously, a two-star general was in the
position to make policy that a three-star (MNC-I) was to follow. Although in prac-
tice this unusual power relationship proved no problem, there were occasions,
mostly related to policies associated with the release of detainees, where the inter-
ests of MNC-I and DCG-DO clashed. Unless the situation was otherwise resolved,
the Commander, MNF-I, made the final decision.
The DCG-DO also commanded TF 134,56 and it was in this position that the
commander spent the great majority of his time.57 The primary responsibility of
TF 134 was the proper care and custody of the detainees in centralized facilities,
known as theater internment facilities (TIFs).58 Subsidiary responsibilities in-
cluded the lawful interrogation of detainees and the provision of due process hear-
ings to the detainees regarding their continued detention.
TF 134 was itself largely made up of individual augmentees and ad hoc units.
Unlike the multinational divisions, where the commanding general would deploy
to Iraq with most of his normal staff, the commander of TF 134 was ordered indi-
vidually to his position. The rest of the headquarters staff consisted of active-duty
officers and enlisted personnel from all of the armed services, or mobilized mem-
bers of the reserves or National Guard. Many were volunteers, serving tour lengths
of four to twelve months, though six months was the norm. Under the headquar-
ters staff were subordinate organizations, though only the major organizations ap-
plicable to this article will be discussed.
1. Care and Custody
Doctrinally, care and custody of detainees is a military police (MP) function,59 and
MP commanders were placed in charge of the theater internment facilities. This
was an instance where an existing staff, normally an MP brigade headquarters,
would deploy in full.60 Their staff would be augmented in theater by individual
augmentees. The guards in the compounds would come from other existing MP
companies, most of which were in the reserve or National Guard,61 or from provi-
sional units of airmen or sailors whose specialties were anything but MP-related
duties.62 Redundant layers of command were necessary to ensure that this diverse
guard force, with its vastly different service experiences, functioned as a cohesive
and professional force in an environment that permitted no mistakes.
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2. Interrogations
All interrogations of detainees within a theater internment facility were conducted
by the Joint Intelligence and Debriefing Center (JIDC). The JIDC was commanded
by a colonel of the military intelligence branch, who reported directly to the Com-
mander, TF 134. The personnel under the JIDC commander comprised a military
intelligence brigade headquarters element, typically from the Army reserves or
Army National Guard, heavily supported by individual augmentees from other
services, as well as by various contractors.
Every security detainee, shortly after his arrival at the theater internment facility
and while still being processed into the facility, would undergo a screening inter-
view by JIDC interrogators.63 The purpose of the screening was to gather basic bio-
graphical information, and to generally assess the detainee’s knowledge and
cooperation.64 Although the facts and circumstances that led to the detainee’s cap-
ture and internment would be discussed, the screener’s task was not to attempt to
prove or disprove the facts underlying the capture; rather, he was to assess whether
the detainee knew anything that would be of future tactical or strategic impor-
tance. For example, if a detainee was captured while emplacing an improvised ex-
plosive device, or IED, the screener would undoubtedly ask about the
circumstances surrounding that act, but would focus his questioning on whether
this detainee knew where the device was made, or who was in charge of the network
responsible for IEDs in that region, and so on. If the screener believed that the de-
tainee had information on these areas, he would schedule the detainee for further
interrogation at a later time. Most detainees, however, were screened as having lit-
tle intelligence value, and were never again interrogated.
The follow-on interrogations which did occur were conducted in accordance
with Army Field Manual 2-22.3,65 as had been made mandatory by the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005.66 The field manual lists the approved “approaches” an in-
terrogator may take with any detainee;67 anything not listed is per se unauthorized
and the manual makes clear that certain actions are always prohibited.68 Though
there was concern that, by explicitly setting out the approaches that would be used,
the quantity and quality of the intelligence gained from interrogations would suf-
fer, anecdotal indications are that the fears have been unjustified.69
3. Legal Reviews
The legal section of TF 134 was uniquely structured, and had a very limited and de-
fined mission. In a normal military command, the judge advocate to a commander
is responsible for providing advice on many topics: military justice, administrative
law, fiscal issues, ethics, operational law and contracts, among others. The com-
mander of TF 134, however, did not have such a judge advocate on his staff; rather,
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the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commander, MNF-I, was tasked to provide him
advice in all of these areas. The head of the TF 134 legal office was instead denomi-
nated as the Legal Advisor to TF 134; his mission was solely the legal processing of
detainees.70
The TF 134 legal office was staffed exclusively by individual augmentees, pre-
dominantly from the Air Force and Navy, with a very few from the Army (mostly
reserve or National Guard), Marine Corps and Coast Guard. At its height in late
2007, the TF 134 legal office had approximately 150 personnel assigned. Of these,
approximately one-third were judge advocate officers, with the remainder made
up of enlisted paralegal specialists, information technology specialists and investi-
gators. As the number of detainees decreased throughout 2008, so did the size of
the TF 134 legal office.
The TF 134 legal office was structured largely along functional lines. Each of the
review boards was assigned a number of judge advocates and enlisted support per-
sonnel. The Central Criminal Court of Iraq liaison office was similarly staffed. A
headquarters element section was also established to coordinate the actions of the
other sections and to process special cases. Each section reported to a designated
officer-in-charge, who reported to the Legal Advisor, who in turn reported to the
DCG-DO.
B. Legal Guidance
As discussed in Part I, the “law” under which the United States operated was the Se-
curity Council resolutions permitting detention for imperative reasons of security;
the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians, specifically Article 78,
would be applied by analogy. In the absence of other binding law,71 policy and reg-
ulatory guidance filled the void. However, in the discussion that follows, it will be
noted that there are few citations to authority, for the following reason: there was
little binding authority.
Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E72 contains overarching guidance for
all US detainee programs. The directive mandates humane treatment for all
detainees73 and, regardless of the detainee’s legal status, requires that the
protections contained in Common Article 3 be applied as a minimum.74 It also
provides that detainees who are not prisoners of war “shall have the basis of their
detention reviewed periodically by competent authority.”75 The directive other-
wise provides little specific guidance.
The Coalition Provisional Authority required, in its Memorandum 3,76 cer-
tain procedures to be followed in the detention of security detainees. Detainees
whose detention lasted more than seventy-two hours would be entitled to a re-
view of the decision to intern,77 and that review had to occur within seven days.78
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Further reviews were required “periodically,” with the first review required within
six months.79
Using these directives as a base, Commander, US Central Command, issued
several supplemental orders which governed detention operations in general and
the legal review process in particular.80 The Commander, MNF-I, further imple-
mented the Central Command orders, especially when the Central Command or-
der permitted the Commander, MNF-I, to delegate certain of the powers that had
been bestowed upon him.81 These orders were still written at a relatively high level
of generality. When they were more detailed, they were usually descriptive of the
procedures already developed within TF 134. Put another way, TF 134 developed
practices and procedures which were thought to best implement the overarching
guidance, though hardly as unconstrained actors, as both Central Command and
MNF-I were always aware of what was going on in TF 134. When the time came to
revise the Central Command and MNF-I orders, those responsible for the revisions
were usually quite satisfied with making directive the procedures being used. A
prime example of this was the Multi-National Force Review Committee
(MNFRC).82 This was a TF 134 initiative to improve the Combined Review and Re-
lease Board (CRRB), but it was not mentioned at the time of its implementation in
either the Central Command or MNF-I directives. When updated, both directives
ordered the implementation of the Multi-National Force Review Committee in the
form in which it was already being used.
This lack of detailed guidance provided a useful degree of flexibility and permit-
ted TF 134 legal personnel, who were dealing with issues on a day-by-day basis, to
adopt procedures best suited to the circumstances. It should not be characterized
as a totally ad hoc process, changeable at will and subject to no oversight. Proce-
dures were not changed unless they yielded improvements and then only after con-
sultation with the chain of command.
Although the procedures occasionally changed, the substantive standard used
throughout all legal reviews was always the same: whether the detainee was an
imperative threat to security. This critical standard never received any further
elaboration in any of guidance discussed above and so the term was used in its col-
loquial sense.83
C. Practice
1. Preliminary Matters
Detention begins when a soldier on the ground determines that a person is a threat.
Coalition forces in Iraq had been authorized the power to detain persons, but had
also been authorized the power to engage in combat operations, which imply the
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use of force (up to and including deadly force): detention on the battlefield is an
application of authorized force. The soldier may decide to subsequently release the
person captured or may decide that he presents a more lasting threat, in which case
he would return to his unit with the detainee in custody. The detainee will be en-
rolled in the unit’s internment facility and if qualified interrogators are available
will be questioned. Within a short period, normally fourteen days, the unit must
decide to release him, or to seek longer-term detention in the theater internment
facility. If the latter, the decision must be approved by a brigade commander.
The detainee is then is either convoyed or flown by the capturing unit to Camp
Cropper TIF,84 which is located within Victory Base Complex.85 At Camp Cropper,
the capturing unit turns over all personal effects of the detainees. These effects are
warehoused until they are returned to the detainee upon his release. The capturing
unit personnel also turn in whatever evidence they have to support continued de-
tention. At a minimum, this must include a completed standard form, which con-
tains, among other things, identifying information about the detainee, a short
synopsis of the conduct which led to his capture and identification of relevant wit-
nesses. In addition, two sworn statements describing the capture or other circum-
stances are required. In most cases, more information would be included, such as
pictures, charts and other relevant statements. Assuming these items were all pro-
duced, TIF personnel “sign” for the detainee and his personal effects, and the cap-
turing unit is relieved of any further responsibility for both.
Administrative in-processing consists of a medical screening and treatment if
required; clothing and supplies issue; and various briefings related to rules and reg-
ulations inside the TIF. Importantly, it is at this point that the detainee is assigned
an internment security number, or ISN;86 it is by this six-digit number that the
detainee will be referred to throughout his period of detention. This entire process
may take two or three days, during which the detainees are segregated from the
general population within the TIF. It is also during this period the JIDC would
perform the initial interrogation screening interview. At the conclusion of the in-
processing, the detainee would be assigned to a compound within Camp Bucca or
Camp Cropper TIFs.
Contemporaneous with the detainee’s in-processing, the detainee’s legal file
will be put together. This all-important file will often serve as a proxy for the de-
tainee himself. Initially it consists only of the paperwork delivered by the capturing
unit, together with the results of the interrogation screening and medical screen-
ing. It is delivered to the Task Force 134 Magistrate Cell for further processing.
At the Magistrate Cell, personnel place the paperwork into standard six-part
folders, labeling the outside of the folder with the detainee’s ISN. The various
parts—standard forms, statements, other evidence, intelligence information, if
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any, and process paperwork—are arbitrarily chosen and only serve to make exam-
ining a particular file for a certain piece of information easier. The file normally
contains only paper, though occasionally capturing units will include a CD-ROM
or DVD which might contain video or scans of additional documents. Real evi-
dence, to the extent that it still exists,87 is referred to in the file but is physically
housed within the Camp Cropper TIF warehouse.
Though a file would seem to be only a file, the detainee file has a few unusual fea-
tures that are worth discussing, if only because they affect future reviews.
First, there are portions of the file that are classified, and the entire folder is
therefore marked as containing classified information, usually at the secret level.
This is rarely an issue in normal processing because all US personnel whose jobs in-
volve these files have a secret clearance. Indeed, in general terms it was possible to
share most classified material with coalition force personnel in the course of duties;
Iraqi members of the Combined Review and Release Board88 were also permitted
access to some classified data. The problem arose when it was necessary to convey
information from the file to the detainee, either in written form or in person, dur-
ing the Multi-National Force Review Committee.89 No classified material could be
shared with the detainee. In those instances, it was necessary to convey information
in more general terms that were not classified. A further problem with classifica-
tion was that some of the material in the file would be classified as prohibiting dis-
semination to all, or most, other countries; the shorthand would be that the
information was classified as NOFORN, meaning no foreign dissemination. Iraqi
members of the Combined Review and Release Board were not permitted access to
NOFORN material. Accordingly, part of the process of putting the files together in
the Magistrate Cell was to segregate NOFORN materials into yet another file folder
that was contained within the normal six-part folder. When the time came to pro-
vide the file to an Iraqi member, for example, the NOFORN folder would be pulled
out, and at the conclusion of the hearings the NOFORN folder would be returned
to the six-part folder for storage.
It should be noted that no sustained effort was attempted to translate all of the
information contained in the file into Arabic. Such a task was beyond the capabili-
ties of the already overworked translators. Certain material (e.g., detainee or wit-
ness written statements) would start in Arabic and be translated into English; the
Arabic material remained in the file. Any correspondence with the detainee was
translated into Arabic, and both the English and Arabic versions were included in
the file. But US service member statements, intelligence and interrogation reports,
and any other documents remained in English only. At the boards where the Iraqi
members did not speak English (a significant number did), the interpreter assigned
to the board would go through the file and provide an on-the-spot translation of
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the relevant documents. This was not a perfect solution, but under the circum-
stances, it was the best that could be done.
The final comment about the files in general concerns one of the most trouble-
some types of evidence—the Iraqi informant. Sectarian violence was often higher
than violence directed against coalition forces. Even within particular sects, there
are the lawless and the law-abiding. Iraqis almost always knew who the “bad guys”
were. It took a personal act of courage by an Iraqi to provide a statement to coali-
tion forces implicating his or her neighbor in insurgent acts. Sometimes these
statements would be the basis upon which targeting decisions would be made. In
other cases, after a person was detained coalition forces would canvass the village
soliciting statements in the hopes that the prospect of the person’s continued de-
tention would encourage informants to come forward. In either case, it was neces-
sary to provide the informant with a measure of confidentiality, as any other course
put the informant’s life in great danger. Some units would protect the informant’s
name by assigning him a number, which is all that would be reflected in the file.90 If
the informant number was not enough to protect him, perhaps because he gave in-
formation that would otherwise reveal his identity, the report might be classified at
some level, which led to the classification problems discussed above.
There were two great difficulties with these statements. First, there was no real-
istic way to test their veracity. Most would be characterized as sworn statements,
yet it was never clear who was administering the oath, and whether the informant
believed that swearing to an American or his designee carried the same weight that
swearing before an Iraqi official would. More important, once the informant pro-
vided his statement, he had no further relationship to the case as it progressed
through the various levels of review. Both the sheer number of detainee cases and
the dangerous security situation in the field made it unlikely that informants would
be interviewed a second time about a particular case, and the format of the reviews,
being administrative rather than criminal, did not require any personal participa-
tion by the informant. So, the informant’s statement had to be taken at face value.
If the informant had provided truthful information in the past (this was often
noted by the capturing unit in the paperwork they provided),91 the board assessing
the information might give it more credence. On the other hand, an informant of
unknown reliability might be viewed with skepticism. The detail provided by the
informant could be another indicator of truth, as might the informant’s averment
that he personally witnessed some action on the part of the detainee as opposed to
merely hearing about it. Corroboration among various informant statements
might also help.
The second problem flowed from the first. It became evident, at least as early as
the time in which the detainee population was growing rapidly, that certain Iraqis
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were informing on their neighbors for personal reasons. The so-called “grudge in-
former” isn’t a new phenomenon.92 If coalition forces received information, credi-
ble on its face, that a person was an insurgent, they would obligingly pick up the
neighbor and whisk him away. In Iraq at the time, there was no effective sanction
for bearing false witness against a neighbor. If subsequently released, the former
detainee would not know the identity of the informant against him so there was no
risk. As boards became more experienced with assessing the validity of informant
statements, these types of statements tended to stand out, but not always.93
2. Magistrate Cell Review
The Magistrate Cell was staffed with an officer-in-charge and ten to twelve attor-
neys, slightly more enlisted paralegals and several interpreters. From the middle of
2007 until the middle of 2008, it operated around the clock, with two shifts work-
ing twelve hours each. This coincided with the surge in troops in Iraq, hence the
greatest influx of detainees. In the fall of 2007, more than sixty detainees, on aver-
age would arrive every day at Camp Cropper TIF and require review by the magis-
trate. The attorney magistrates would typically review cases from a single
operational area; for example, two attorneys might be assigned to cases coming
from Multi-National Division Central. The benefit of this arrangement was that
the reviewing attorney was better able to become familiar with the method of pro-
cessing the evidence used by that unit and build a relationship with those responsi-
ble for the processing at the operational level.
Through policy, the Magistrate Cell review was to be complete within seven
days of the detainee’s arriving at the TIF.94 Accordingly, the attorney magistrates
would begin working on the cases as they came in and the file folders were assem-
bled. In practice, the seven-day limit was rarely violated, despite the overwhelming
number of cases arriving daily.
The procedure used by the magistrate was unremarkable: did the evidence con-
tained in the folder95 support the belief that this person was an imperative threat
to security? If the magistrate’s answer was yes, a notification was prepared for the
detainee and his detention would continue, subject to subsequent reviews. If no,
the capturing unit was given notification of the intent to release the detainee and
invited to submit additional evidence that might not have been included in the
original package. The magistrate would also frequently contact the capturing unit
asking for clarification of materials in the package; for example, if there is a refer-
ence in the file to a witness statement that was not there, the magistrate would call
and ask for it. The intent was not to perfect the case for continued detention, but
only to ensure that all the available facts were in front of the decisionmaker. If,
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after these efforts, the evidence was still insufficient the detainee would be pro-
cessed for release.
The attorney magistrate’s decision was, in general effect, final. There were too
many cases coming through the office for the officer-in-charge to do anything
more than random quality assurance checks and the TF 134 Legal Advisor was even
less able to oversee individual cases. Insofar as these attorneys would process many
hundreds of cases during their tours, their judgment became quite refined.
An additional decision made by the attorney magistrate was whether there was
sufficient competent evidence in the file to merit prosecution at the Central
Criminal Court of Iraq.96 As seen, the paper file was sufficient for the purposes of
deciding on continued detention, but the file alone, to the extent that its contents
could even be shared given its often classified nature, would not prevail in a
prosecution in Iraqi court where witnesses and physical evidence were neces-
sary. Accordingly, the magistrate would refer those cases that appeared to contain
the requisite unclassified and available evidence to the TF 134 legal office charged
with assisting with prosecutions. The magistrates were instructed to be liberal in
referring cases, since cases could be non-referred, but there was no effective mech-
anism to prosecute cases which had not been referred in the first place. Even with
this liberal practice, the referral rate for prosecution was fairly constant at only 15
to 20 percent.
The notification of continued detention prepared when the magistrate decided
that continued detention was appropriate was additionally styled as an advisement
of appeal rights, with an invitation to the detainee to choose to appeal, and, if he did
so, to submit reasons why he was not an imperative threat to security. These notifi-
cations were delivered to the detainees in translated form and read to those who
were illiterate.97 Written appeals were translated back into English and entered into
the file for review by the next board.
3. Combined Review and Release Board Review
Regardless of whether the detainee elected to appeal his continued detention, his
case would be reviewed automatically by the appellate body, called the Combined
Review and Release Board, or CRRB. To put it another way, the CRRB reviewed ev-
ery case that passed through the Magistrate Cell. The CRRB was to review the case
within ninety days,98 though in practice, especially once the Multi-National Force
Review Committee came into being, the CRRB review was completed within two
or three weeks of the magistrate’s decision to continue detention. Until it was re-
placed by the Multi-National Force Review Committee, discussed below, the
CRRB also performed the six-month periodic review of every detainee’s case. The
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CRRB procedures were the same, whether the case before it was an initial appeal or
later periodic review.
The CRRB was a panel made up of both Iraqi and coalition force officials. The
Iraqi members were generally civilian employees from the Ministries of the Inte-
rior, Justice and Human Rights. The coalition forces members were always US mil-
itary officers, usually drawn from MNF-I staff elements. The panels were
composed so that each had an Iraqi majority, although due to absences, that was
not always possible. The lack of an Iraqi majority did not invalidate the board. To
permit the attendance of the Iraqi members, the CRRB convened in the Interna-
tional Zone. The members were already working elsewhere in the International
Zone, and were provided with passes, or were met and escorted, which permitted
their entrance to the US Embassy Annex within the International Zone.
The process was overseen by the CRRB office of the TF 134 legal office, with an
officer-in-charge and four to six attorneys, together with paralegal and interpreter
support. The CRRB office was responsible for “docketing” all the cases and prepar-
ing the files for review. The file would be reviewed to ensure its completeness and
the reviewing attorney would write a summary of the case, which would be trans-
lated into Arabic. Material which could not be shared with the Iraqis because of its
classification as NOFORN would be placed in a separate folder within the larger
detainee folder if it had not already been done beforehand. Boards were held up to
five days a week, depending on the cases ready for review and member availability.
On the day of any particular board, the files would be brought to a conference
room where the members had been assembled. A CRRB attorney and interpreter
would accompany the files. There was little ceremony. If there were no Iraqi mem-
bers, or if the Iraqis read and understood English, as many did, each member
would read through the file on his own and provisionally vote whether there was
sufficient evidence to consider the detainee an imperative threat to security or not.
Discussion of the cases was encouraged, though it was up to the members how
much they did, if at all. At the end of the consideration and discussion, the votes
would be tallied; a majority prevailed. If the Iraqi members did not understand
English, the interpreter would perform an ad hoc translation of the relevant evi-
dentiary documents in the file as it was impossible, due to the volume of cases and
chronic shortage of skilled interpreters, to translate everything in every file other
than the CRRB attorney-prepared summary of the case. Discussion of the cases had
to be through the medium of the interpreter, but it still occurred. The CRRB attor-
ney played little role in the board other than ensuring that all the files were consid-
ered and the voting was taking place.
The historic recommended-for-release rate at the CRRB was approximately 12
to 15 percent, especially when it was the only board conducting periodic reviews.
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Once the CRRB became the initial appeal–only board, the recommended-for-
release rate increased, but only marginally, never reaching 20 percent.
4. Multi-National Force Review Committee Review
The CRRB was an efficient, though not necessarily effective, tool for determining
whether a detainee was an imperative threat to security. Chief among the problems
was the file on which the reviews were based: there was little or no change in the file
from review to review. The evidence supporting the detainee’s initial detention, as-
suming that it was sufficient to pass through previous boards, was more likely than
not to also prove sufficient to pass through any subsequent boards. Indeed, the
only real differences among the boards were the change in the membership review-
ing the file; different members might reach different conclusions based on the
same evidence in the file. The CRRB was also, perversely, too efficient, especially
when members, most notably the Iraqi members, were long-term members. As
with any task, the longer one works on it, the better and faster one becomes. The
detainee files were often quite thick, but among all the paper there were usually
only a couple of very important pieces of relevant information. Ignoring the trivia,
an experienced member knew what to look for, but it occasionally happened that
the trivia contained information that could have a bearing on the outcome. Never-
theless, as the board had a hundred or more files before it every day, careful consider-
ation of each was usually sacrificed for speed. A factor in this as well was that the
review became that of the file, not the underlying person whom the file represented.
Each file had, as its first page, a picture of the detainee, and occasionally had other
photographs of him as part of the evidence, but this was not always enough to im-
press upon the members that they were dealing with a real person, not just an ISN.
The file-only method of review had a more practical downside: disruption in the
TIFs. General Stone, the DCG-DO at the time, would often liken the situation to
that of the movie The Gods Must Be Crazy, in which a Coke bottle, discarded from a
passing airplane, lands near an African tribesman, and he then attempts to return
this gift of the gods. Releases from the TIFs were almost as haphazard, at least from
the detainees’ point of view. One day a detainee would be tapped on the shoulder
and told that he was about to be released: he didn’t know how that decision was
reached or why. Likewise, those detainees around him, who didn’t get the tap, were
equally mystified about why they too were not being released. Detainee discontent
resulted in riots and near-riots becoming increasingly common in Camp Bucca.99
For all these reasons, the DCG-DO decided to institute a new review procedure,
which was named the Multi-National Force Review Committee. The single biggest
innovation was that the detainee was to appear before the board and participate in
the hearing. This led to many other practical changes.
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First, because transportation of large numbers of detainees was impossible, the
detainees could not come to the boards. Instead, the boards had to go to the detain-
ees. Accordingly, all boards would henceforth be held within the TIFs in order to
facilitate easy and secure detainee movement. Space to hold the boards was initially
a problem, but was solved relatively quickly. Camp Cropper only required a single
board to handle its volume of boards and a trailer in the TIF proved adequate to the
need. At Camp Bucca, with its much larger detainee population, a suite of trailers
was eventually installed to comprise what became known as the “Justice Complex.”
It included several board rooms, administrative spaces and a holding area for the
detainees.
Second, whereas the CRRB was able to work through a hundred or more cases in
a day, any reasonable board procedure involving the detainee would have to accept
many fewer completed boards per day. With a detainee population during this pe-
riod exceeding 20,000, topping out at more than 26,000 in the fall of 2007, it was
necessary to complete just under one thousand boards per week in order to ensure
that all detainees were provided a review every six months (or twenty-six weeks).
This necessitated greatly expanding the number of boards running every day. Vari-
ous combinations were tried, with nine boards (eight at Camp Bucca, one at Camp
Cropper) hearing twenty cases per day, with boards held six days a week finally be-
ing settled upon. This gave a theoretic capacity of over one thousand cases per
week, though that capacity was never reached as boards would often be cancelled
and rescheduled due to administrative difficulties with moving files, detainee un-
availability due to sickness, difficulty in finding sufficient members to sit on the
boards or security issues beyond control (e.g., a security operation or exercise run
by TIF leadership). As many as thirty boards per day were tried, but that proved to
be too many, exhausting the board members. As the detainee population de-
creased, the number of hearings per day per board was decreased. It was found that
anything less than fifteen hearings per day was too “easy” on the members, when
the standard workday in Iraq was twelve hours. The solution was to slowly decrease
the number of boards, maintaining fifteen to twenty hearings for each.
Third, because of the increased number of boards, there was an increased need
for members. Recall that the CRRB was a joint Iraqi–coalition forces board. With
that in mind, the Iraqis were approached prior to the first MNFRC, briefed on the
concept, and asked whether they would like to participate as members. Although
they were supportive of the new board system and expressed an interest in sending
members, no Iraqi members ever participated. This could be explained by a num-
ber of reasons. The CRRB was held in the International Zone, close to the ministry
offices of the Iraqi members. Gaining access to the Embassy Annex complex
through security was a challenge, but one that was met. Now the boards were being
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held at the TIFs. Daily travel to Camp Cropper from the International Zone was
possible, but only in armored convoys. Travel to Camp Bucca was all but impossi-
ble for the Iraqis on their own, and spending an extended period at that very re-
mote location, once they got there, would not have appealed to any of the potential
Iraqi members. While the Iraqis would have been welcomed as members, their ab-
sence did lead to many administrative conveniences, as there was no need to worry
about access to classified material in the files that could not be shared with the
Iraqis and no material in the files needed to be translated by the interpreters.
The question was where to find the other members. MNC-I was initially invited
to send members prior to the first boards, but declined, although as will be dis-
cussed it did send members later. With no Iraqis, no MNC-I members, and no ex-
tant ability to task other units to provide members, all MNFRC members were at
first drawn from TF 134. Officers from throughout Camp Bucca were tasked with
sitting on the boards, without being relieved of their normal duties. Senior officers
in the grade of O-4 and above to sit as president of each board were in especially
short supply and therefore those that were available were tasked disproportion-
ately. The TF 134 chief of staff decreed that all TF 134 staff officers assigned to the
headquarters would travel to Camp Bucca to sit on boards for two weeks. This
helped, though wasn’t a full solution. TF 134 also requested, and was granted, the
assignment of a group of officers and senior enlisted personnel whose sole job in
Iraq would be as MNFRC members. They reported administratively to the Legal
Advisor. Their presence greatly relieved the burden on personnel assigned to the
TIF staff from sitting as members. Additionally, as these permanent MNFRC
members heard more and more cases their expertise greatly increased, improving
decisions. Nevertheless, the “TF 134–only” boards were responsible for the lack of
acceptance of the results early in the process.
With no prior practice to consult in the design of the MNFRC, the procedures
utilized for an Article 5 tribunal,100 set forth in the Army regulation providing pol-
icy and procedures for the treatment of, inter alia, detainees,101 were used by anal-
ogy. The board was composed of three members. The president was a senior
officer, O-4 or above. One of the other members could be a senior enlisted person,
in the grade of E-7 or above.102 Each member was provided with a memorandum
entitled “Instruction to Members,” signed by the DCG-DO, which set forth his ex-
pectations for their performance and his thanks for their serving as members.103
Each member signed the memorandum indicating he or she had read and under-
stood the contents. MNFRC staff members would also provide training on the pro-
cess, especially on how to read and understand the detainee files.
The night before the board the members were required to read the files, taking
notes as necessary. The boards began early in the morning and ran until all were
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completed. Each board was held in a separate hearing room, minimally configured
with a table in the front for the members, a table for the detainee, a seat for the in-
terpreter and several chairs in the back for any observers. A guard was always pres-
ent, in whose physical custody the detainee always remained.
The hearing followed a script. The president began by explaining the nature of
the hearing and its purpose, paying special attention to an explanation of the stan-
dard of imperative threat to security that the board would be using to arrive at its
decision. The detainee was told that he could offer evidence of any kind. He could
make a statement, but was not compelled to do so. If he consented to make a state-
ment and to answer questions, he was encouraged to speak truthfully; to this end
he was sworn in in an appropriate manner. The preliminaries over, the president
detailed the nature of the evidence against the detainee. The detainee then had the
opportunity to rebut the evidence.104 The board members would then ask ques-
tions, usually about the detainee’s pre-capture conduct, but also about his conduct
within the TIF and often his intentions once he was released. At the conclusion of
this portion, the president would return to the script, remind the detainee that the
board would be voting on whether the detainee presented an imperative threat to
security, and dismiss him back to the TIF. The members would deliberate and vote;
a majority vote won. Each member would sign the voting sheet and a short descrip-
tion of why the board voted as it did was written on it. The dissenting member, if
any, also had the opportunity to write a short statement. The MNFRC staff mem-
ber collected the voting sheet and file, and set up the next board.
The critical role of the interpreter must be mentioned here. Accurate, faithful
interpretation was required but occasionally not delivered. All interpreters were
hired by a government contractor, which certified as proficient all those it hired.
Some were clearly more proficient than others,105 but in a theater where interpret-
ers of any proficiency were in short supply, the MNFRC staff was happy to have ev-
ery one it had. Another problem that sometimes occurred was that the interpreter
took on too much of an expanded role, propounding questions that weren’t asked
by the assigned members or embellishing answers made by the detainee. In certain
situations, this made sense; for example, if the detainee didn’t understand the
question as phrased by the member, the interpreter could more reasonably ask it in
a different manner or as a series of questions. At other times, the interpreter’s in-
trusion was improper and was stopped.
The MNFRC result yielded a recommendation to the DCG-DO on the status of
the detainee: its vote to release did not itself effect a release. All recommendations
for release had to be approved by the DCG-DO,106 who was free in theory and prac-
tice to disregard the recommendation of the MNFRC or that of any of the other
boards earlier discussed. This was a continued complaint of the International
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Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives. In the ICRC’s view, the board
deciding the appeal under either Article 43 or 78 of the Civilians Convention
needed to be “independent,” and to have the final authority on release.107 The
complaint had two strands. One was that the members of the boards needed to be
independent of the DCG-DO; because the members all worked for TF 134, they
were not independent. The response was always that, as a practical matter, the
DCG-DO had little interest in, and absolutely no direct input into, any board. His
interest was merely institutional: Was the procedure fair and being followed? Were
the members being exposed to all the evidence and were they voting their con-
science? If so, results in any particular case were a matter outside of the DCG-DO’s
notice. Never were magistrates or board members upbraided for their recommen-
dations and so they were independent in reality, even if not in theory.
There was no good answer to the second strand of the complaint about the
DCG-DO’s final authority. The regulations delegating release authority to the
DCG-DO did not permit further delegation to a lower level such as a board nor
would the DCG-DO have been inclined to do so even if possible. His ability to pro-
vide quality assurance provided some level of comfort in the operating forces that
releases were appropriate.108 In the great majority of cases, the recommendation of
the MNFRC (or any other review board) was followed, and the detainee released.
In those instances when the recommendation was not followed, it was because of
additional information being brought forward that convinced the DCG-DO that
the detainee remained an imperative threat.109
From the beginning, the MNFRC yielded a higher release rate than the CRRB.
The institutional response progressed from expectation, through mild alarm, to fi-
nal acceptance. Some explanation is in order. When the MNFRC was first insti-
tuted, it had a minimum number of boards; the CRRB still functioned as the
primary six-month review mechanism. It happened at a time that there was an in-
dependent requirement for major releases of detainees (e.g., the coalition generally
released a number of detainees during Ramadan as a gesture of goodwill). To “har-
vest” these increased numbers of releases, the early boards were “seeded” with cases
of detainees who were thought to represent lower threats. The resulting release rec-
ommendation rate for these MNFRCs was just under 25 percent, compared with
12 to 15 percent for the CRRB, fulfilling the need for releases. The rate was high,
but expected. However, once the “seeding” stopped and regular cases came before
the boards, the recommended release rate stayed at around 25 percent, and actually
began increasing, until it reached a relatively steady rate of over 40 percent. This
was the alarm phase, mostly on the part of the operating forces, which increasingly
came to view the MNFRC as merely a release board. Within the TF 134 staff, the in-
creasing recommended release rate was troubling only if it indicated that either the
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process was bad, or the members were not taking their duties seriously. Investiga-
tion proved neither to be true. Put another way, the TF 134 staff’s view was that if
the process was fair—and was followed—the recommended release rate was
merely whatever it was. The substantial increase over that of the CRRB was attrib-
uted to three factors. The first was the presence of the detainee. As a simple matter
of human nature, having a real person in front of you, instead of merely a file with
his picture, is more likely to engender empathy, and, in close cases, may make the
difference. Second, though the detainee’s evidence was nearly always just his state-
ment and answers to questions, it was more than what was in the paper file. Finally,
a board process, following a script, lent itself to greater deliberation on each case.
Matters which might have escaped the notice of the CRRB could be discovered by a
board which had more time to review the case.
Final acceptance of the MNFRC process, and the higher recommended release
rate, took more time. In the beginning of 2008, MNC-I members began to partici-
pate on the MNFRC. At the direction of MNF-I, MNFRC panels would have two
MNC-I members each, giving them the majority vote. The results were instructive.
On the first Saturday110 with MNC-I members, the recommended release rate
“dropped” to around 20 percent. On Sunday, it increased to maybe 24 percent, and
so on, upward every day, until by Thursday it was again near 40 percent. On Satur-
day, new members would be seated, and the process repeated. Eventually, Satur-
day’s rate began increasing, and within several months, the new boards were
consistently recommending releases at around 40 percent, regardless of the day.111
The reasons could only be discovered anecdotally. In the beginning, hostility to-
ward the process was clearly evident; that hostility waned as individual members’
tenures wore on and waned organizationally as MNC-I recognized that these re-
sults were attributable to their own members. In the end, the operating forces,
through their participation in the release process, took an ownership stake, which
led to their acceptance of the results.
Although the MNFRC received many improvements—a more focused script,
permanent members, MNC-I members—one of the more interesting was the as-
signment of personal representatives to some of the detainees. The credit belongs
to the ICRC representatives who first proposed the idea. As indicated, detainees
appeared before the MNFRC alone. Among the population of detainees was a sig-
nificant number of juveniles.112 The ICRC asked whether it was possible to help the
juvenile detainees at their MNFRC review for it would be a very important, but also
forbidding, process for them. The ICRC representative initially suggested assigning
counsel to the juveniles. A compromise was reached, modeling the concept on that
of the personal representative assigned to persons appearing before a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal.113 The personal representative was not a lawyer; his or her
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role was not to act as an advocate during the hearing. Rather, the representative’s
role was to assist the detainee in preparing for the hearing, explaining the process
and appearing with him at the hearing. The personal representative could make a
statement for the detainee and could suggest to the members questions that might
be relevant, but he or she was not to offer argument in the manner of counsel.
The implementation of providing a personal representative for juveniles began
in late 2007. One of the officers assigned as a permanent MNFRC member was re-
assigned as the juvenile personal representative. A naval reservist, whose civilian
job was as a school teacher with significant counseling experience, was chosen for
the position; experience showed that she was an excellent choice. Experience also
showed, as reported by MNFRC members and juvenile detainees alike, that the ini-
tiative was a success. The ICRC next asked to expand the program to represent
other vulnerable populations, to include female detainees, third-country nationals
(i.e., detainees who were not citizens of Iraq) and those detainees with diminished
mental capacity. These, too, were successfully implemented, mostly because of the
overall limited numbers.114 Expanding the program further was explored with the
ICRC, but no other discrete population that needed representation was identified.
The ICRC was unapologetic in its request that every detainee receive the benefit,
but that was logistically and administratively impractical. Indeed, the ICRC, while
happy enough with the limited personal representation, never hid its ambition to
push the MNFRC process until, step-by-step, legal counsel were assigned to all de-
tainees at every hearing.
Though not part of the MNFRC process, some mention should be made of the
programs offered to the detainees within the TIF, as participation in some of these
could have a positive impact on the detainee’s case. In mid-2007, when faced with
rising numbers of detainees and rising discontent among them, the DCG-DO de-
cided to implement a set of formal programs that eventually became known as
Theater Internment Facility Reconciliation Center, or TIFRC, services.115 The ser-
vices included literacy programs (well over half of the detainee population was illit-
erate), limited vocational training, work programs and religious engagement
classes.116 Though these programs could be viewed as a kind of social work, the fo-
cus was on reducing the threat a participating detainee presented, thereby facilitat-
ing his earlier release from custody. The programs had two main purposes. The
first responded to the finding that a majority of the detainees had joined the insur-
gency for money: they had no jobs and were willing to take cash to emplace IEDs,
etc. The vocational training and work programs were designed to address that
problem. The second purpose responded to the belief that insurgent extremists
were misusing Islam to encourage insurgent acts as a religious duty. Once the de-
tainees learned to read, they could study the Quran, with the help of Iraqi clerics
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contracted by US forces, and determine for themselves that Islam teaches quite the
opposite. The hope was that completion of the programs would change a former
security threat into no threat at all.
The TIFRC concept was developed contemporaneously with the MNFRC, and
integrated into the MNFRC’s process. MNFRC members were specifically directed
to consider the detainee’s participation, if any, in the TIFRC services in making
their determination on whether he presented an imperative threat. It was to be
considered merely as a factor among many: there was no pressure to recommend
release for successful participants, and failure to participate was not to be consid-
ered negatively. Additionally, the MNFRC members had the opportunity to rec-
ommend for future TIFRC participation those detainees whose detention they
decided to continue but who might benefit, next time, from having gone through
the programs. Providing them with this recommendatory power was valuable early
in the TIFRC process when the services were just beginning. When the services be-
came more widely available to all detainees, the MNFRCs were no longer given the
option of “retain, with TIFRC.”
5. Special Release Processing
The discussion up to this point has focused on regularly scheduled reviews, from
the initial review at the Magistrate Cell through the CRRB and MNFRC. However,
there was another significant method by which detainees’ cases would be reviewed,
and detainees released—that was through special release processing. Although there
were many ways that the special release process could be initiated, the single constant
was that the DCG-DO made an individual decision whether to grant the release.
Special release requests originated from many sources. Some came from Iraqi
officials. It was a rare meeting with Iraqi government officials, or other important
personages, such as influential sheiks, where the DCG-DO did not return with a list
of detainees to consider for special release. Other requests would come from within
the coalition: officials from the battalion through the MNF-I level would often ask
for releases to further their engagement efforts. A somewhat separate category in-
cluded those requests from doctors, asking for the compassionate release of detain-
ees with terminal or serious medical conditions.
These requests were individually processed.117 Attorneys within the headquar-
ters element of the TF 134 legal office would be designated as “Special Release At-
torneys,” whose job would be to research the case, write a memo detailing the
relevant facts, and make a recommendation as to whether the request should be
granted or not. The memo was staffed through the Legal Advisor to the DCG-DO,
who would make the final decision. The standard against which the decisions were
made remained the same—imperative threat to security—but there was a
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willingness to accept more risk in these releases than with normal periodic reviews.
This was most evident for requests which originated from within the coalition: if a
ground commander, with knowledge of the detainee’s background,118 was willing
to accept him back within his battlespace, with reluctance the request was often
granted. There was generally less tolerance of risk with requests from Iraqi officials,
though the political considerations associated with such requests could often tip
the balance.
6. Criminal Prosecution
CPA Memo 3 provided that coalition forces could detain two classes of persons:
those “suspected of having committed criminal acts and [who] are not considered
security threats,”119 and others “for imperative reasons of security in accordance
with the mandate set out in UNSCR 1546.”120 To the extent the authority to detain
persons for criminal acts had been used earlier, by 2007 it was exceptionally rare for
coalition forces to apprehend and hold a person who presented only a criminal
threat. Rather, all detainees processed into the TIF went through the Magistrate
Cell and were assessed as imperative threats to security as already described. That is
not to say that criminal prosecutions did not occur, for that was another major op-
eration that must be discussed, albeit briefly.121
CPA Order 13122 established a national-level court called the Central Criminal
Court of Iraq, or CCCI. The Court’s jurisdiction extended to all criminal viola-
tions, misdemeanor or felony, though in its discretionary jurisdiction it was en-
couraged to concentrate on the most serious cases, such as terrorism, acts intended
to destabilize democratic institutions, and violence based on race, nationality, eth-
nicity or religion.123 The CCCI sat in Baghdad in a building just outside the Inter-
national Zone. It was the court to which all coalition force detainee criminal cases
were referred.
Within the TF 134 legal office there was a CCCI liaison office, which was tasked
to prepare cases for eventual prosecution at CCCI. Attorneys within that office
would receive the files forwarded to it from the Magistrate Cell and determine,
based on their experience with the Court, whether prosecution was worthwhile,
based on either the nature of the misconduct alleged or the state of the evidence
and availability of witnesses. A case for which prosecution was not deemed worth-
while was “non-referred,” after which the detainee’s case would be returned for re-
view by the CRRB or MNFRC, as appropriate, to determine whether he remained
an imperative threat.
Those cases that warranted prosecution were prepared for prosecution by the
CCCI liaison office attorney, and then presented to the Iraqi prosecutor and inves-
tigative judge for proceedings in accordance with the Iraqi criminal code. It is
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important to note that the CCCI liaison office attorneys did not themselves prose-
cute any case; however, their role hardly ended with passing off a prepared case file.
The CCCI liaison office attorney would collect all physical evidence, summarize all
other evidence, arrange the presence of witnesses and ensure that the detainee
defendant appeared. The attorney would be present for the investigative hearing and
subsequent trial, and would be responsive to any questions or requests for evidence
from the judges. Investigative judges would often solicit from the attorney questions
that they (the judges) might want to ask. If the CCCI liaison office attorney didn’t act
as the prosecutor, he or she was certainly a very active “shadow” prosecutor.
Convictions resulted in just less than 60 percent of the cases. Compared to those
of any normal US jurisdiction, where conviction rates regularly exceed 90 percent,
these results were not particularly impressive. However, there were several reasons
to be satisfied with the results. The Iraqi system did not engage in any type of plea
bargaining, so a powerful incentive to plead guilty to charges was removed. A de-
fendant taking his chances at trial is occasionally rewarded. CCCI liaison attorneys
were also forced to take cases to trial they knew would not result in conviction. For
example, assume coalition forces raid a house and find a cache of illegal weapons,
IED-making materials, etc. They detain all of the military-aged males in the house.
CCCI liaison attorneys would have to bring all of these persons to the joint trial,
knowing that the Court was likely to convict only the owner of the house or some-
one else who could be said to have possessed the weapons, acquitting the rest. If
even one of the persons found during the raid was not brought to trial, all defen-
dants would point to the missing person as the possessor of the weapons and the
Court would find no one guilty.
Those convicted would be transferred to Iraqi custody as soon as possible but
due to the overcrowding of Iraqi facilities it often did not happen quickly. These
detainees remained in the TIF, though in a separate compound, while awaiting
eventual transfer. They were otherwise treated the same as all other detainees,
other than that their periodic reviews ended because they were considered to have
begun serving their sentences.
If the Court failed to convict the detainee defendant, the criminal proceeding
ended but the person was still a security detainee. These cases would be immedi-
ately reviewed by the CRRB or MNFRC for its recommendation. In the case where
the file contained information that could not be shared with the Court because of
its classification, the board could well conclude that the detainee remained a threat
and recommend his continued detention despite the acquittal. This was a source of
confusion for the detainee and of tension with the Court, though most of the
judges understood the separate security-based detention authority.
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Part III—Applications for the Future
This article has presented a description of the detainee operations during a portion
of coalition operations in Iraq, and may prove to be of some limited value in the
documentation of that experience. However, more important, the lessons learned
may prove to be useful in future operations. The following comments and recom-
mendations are offered in that hope.
Before offering such comments, it is important to insist that the practices de-
scribed earlier or recommended below should not be taken as establishing custom
that will bind the United States or others in similar situations. The law, such as it
was applied by analogy to detainee operations, is not very detailed nor, in some
ways, very demanding. This author is confident that the reviews of the cases of de-
tained persons went beyond what the law required. The United States was able to
set the conditions for the practices described by devoting substantial financial and
personnel resources to the detention mission in Iraq; those generous resources
may not be available in a future operation, and thus it may become necessary to ad-
here only to the more minimal requirements of the positive law. Other nations may
not have the resources under any circumstances to enable them to provide more
than the law requires and the US practices should not force them, through a claim
of a new customary international law obligation, to try.
A. Detainee Personal Appearance
All things being equal, a review at which the detainee appears and speaks is likely to
be better than one in which he is not given that opportunity. “Better” in this con-
text means more likely to arrive at a correct assessment of the level of threat the de-
tainee presents. Detention is costly: to the detaining power in resources and
personnel; to the detainee and his family, which often suffers; and to the occupied
or host nation, depending on the legal authority for the detention, which needs to
move beyond civilian internment as it reasserts its own sovereignty. Of course, in a
situation in which civilian internment is permitted in any form, things are not al-
ways equal. The somewhat relaxed requirements for hearings under the Geneva
Conventions clearly recognize that in a conflict certain unavoidable impositions
on individual rights will occur and that even a minimal process will, if followed, be
better than no process at all.
Nevertheless, if resources permit, it would be worthwhile to permit the detainee
to appear at all levels of review. The MNFRC proved successful, and if it worked
with over twenty thousand detainees, it would certainly work in smaller-scale de-
tention operations. The CRRB would have been replaced totally by the MNFRC in
its reduced role as the ninety-day appeal board but for the Iraqi participation.
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Insofar as Iraqi participation on the MNFRC was unable to be arranged and the
CRRB was the only time when the Iraqis did participate, it was determined to be
politically inexpedient to abolish it. However, a future detention operation need
not be constrained by these considerations, and the appeal and subsequent review
board could be designed from the beginning with the appropriate membership.
Permitting a personal appearance at the initial review stage, at the point where
the Magistrate Cell functioned, need not require an MNFRC-like panel (though it
could); it is quite possible for the magistrate to conduct the hearing, and make the
decision, alone. Consideration was given to permitting detainees to personally ap-
pear before the Magistrate Cell, but insufficient manning prevented that from oc-
curring. The attorneys assigned as magistrates were already employed full-time in
preparing and perfecting the files, writing summaries, and so on, and levying an
additional requirement upon them to hold a hearing for each of those same cases
would have been impossible. But, as stated before, with greater personnel re-
sources, or with fewer cases, it would have been possible and beneficial.
The problem with this recommendation is that it is essentially irrevocable dur-
ing the remainder of that operation. Should personal appearance be the standard
set at the beginning, and the operational tempo dramatically increases or the secu-
rity situation deteriorates, it will be difficult to revert to a file-only review, mostly
because of the negative reaction from the detainees,124 and possibly by organiza-
tions, such as the ICRC, monitoring the process. There is a certain appeal, there-
fore, in starting with the minimums and improving them once a steady state has
been realized.
B. Personal Representatives
The decision to grant a personal representative to the detainees, or any subgroups
thereof, must be based on the perceived need and the availability of resources. It
may yield better results and will help the perception of fairness by the detainees. Ef-
forts to turn any of the hearings into a fully adversarial process, with or without the
involvement of counsel, should be resisted until such time as national policy-
makers direct a different course, and then only after debating the compatibility of
such a procedure in an area of conflict.
C. Technology
Better uses of technology may not have directly benefited the quality of the reviews,
but certainly would have eased the administrative burdens associated with the
hearings. Consider the role of the detainee file. It was the centerpiece of every re-
view, even at the MNFRC. If the file was lost or missing, nothing could be done
with that detainee. (In almost all cases, the file could often be reassembled from its
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constituent parts scattered throughout the force.) The logistical effort to track and
move the files was impressive. The files were assembled at the Magistrate Cell, and
when their review was complete, they were boxed up and convoyed to the Interna-
tional Zone, where they would be collected by the CRRB (and a more limited num-
ber by the CCCI liaison office). Upon completion of the CRRB review, they were
boxed up again, convoyed back to Victory Base, put on a plane at Baghdad Interna-
tional Airport, flown to Basra, and convoyed to Camp Bucca. If the file was needed
for special release processing, it would return along that path to Victory Base Com-
plex, and maybe back to Camp Bucca again later before it returned to another way
station in this possibly unending process.
Ideally, files would begin their lives as scanned images, using a program such as
Adobe Acrobat to organize the pages in a standardized manner similar to the six-
part folders. New material (e.g., the results of a periodic review) could be inserted
at the appropriate place in the electronic file. The files would reside on a central
server, with visibility throughout the force. Board members would each have com-
puters with which to read the electronic files.
Many efforts were made to reach this ideal, but the sheer number of files in
existence made it impractical with the then-current resources. Scanning can be
time consuming and quality assurance must be strict if all paper documents are
to be destroyed. Each resulting file often exceeds twenty-five megabytes in size.
While storage requirements are considerable, though manageable, bandwidth con-
siderations are not so easily solved. Some method must be reached to ensure the
“originality” of a single version (the paper file system has this obvious advantage)
that can be changed only by those authorized to do so. None of these problems are
intractable—bandwidth will likely be the most difficult challenge, as it is always in
short supply, especially in an area of conflict—and future technological innova-
tion may make their solutions so much easier.
Another technological solution, one which was investigated but not imple-
mented mostly due to lack of bandwidth again, was “virtual” hearings, at which
one or more of the members might participate from a remote location. Such a sys-
tem would have much appeal, eliminating the onerous travel to a remote location
such as Camp Bucca.125 The quality of the resulting hearing, however, would be
correlated to the quality of the video-teleconference link, as the visual aspects of a
hearing are often more important than the aural. Compare, for example, a situa-
tion where the members appeared to the detainee, and the detainee to the mem-
bers, on a laptop screen using a webcam versus a full-motion, wide-screen
presentation. A virtual presence is always inferior to real presence; the issue is al-
ways how much degradation is acceptable.
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D. Broad Participation Membership
Boards, specifically the MNFRC, worked well with “general purpose” officers, yet
as the process matured and the types of persons who sat on the boards broadened
the process improved. When designing a review panel for a future board, it would
be best to begin with the broadest possible participation.
In an operation which permits the involvement of representatives of the host
nation, the benefit of having them participate will likely outweigh the administra-
tive burdens (clearances and disclosure predominantly). They need not be given
the majority vote, such as was the case in the CRRB, though the political situation,
especially one in which the visiting force’s presence is based on host-nation con-
sent, may warrant that concession. The cultural sensitivities and awareness that
such members bring to the board cannot be otherwise replicated.
Concerning own-force members, senior enlisted members are always a valuable
addition, despite an otherwise pervasive preference for officers only.126 Members
from the operating forces must participate. In addition to their wealth of experi-
ence resulting from seeing the same type of incidents that have resulted in deten-
tion occur firsthand, their involvement helps to lend an ownership stake in the
process to the operating forces.127 Permanent members, if they are available, will
almost certainly have little or no operating exposure, but their experience review-
ing many, many boards will help to establish some parity of treatment across the
process.
E. Programs within the TIF
Administrative detention has been recognized as necessary during the types of op-
erations described. The conditions under which the detainees are held must com-
port with enumerated standards: these responsibilities are doctrinally exercised by
the military police, and help to maintain the peace and order of the detainee camps.
However, the same conditions may also have a direct bearing on the legal reviews.
Programs such as those of the TF 134 TIFRC discussed above are designed to re-
duce the threat the detainees present post-capture. Participation in these programs
by the detainee must be highlighted to the board reviewing his continued deten-
tion and assessed as one additional factor among many in determining whether the
detainee remains an imperative threat. If members, educated about the TIFRC
programs, are according them no weight in their decisions, the programs should be
changed or cancelled, except to the extent that they serve a separate military police
function within the TIF. On the other hand, programs which have a positive effect
on board decisions should be expanded, with the hope of greater numbers of re-
leases of those who are no longer threats.
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Conclusion
Detention, in some form, is a reality in every operation, just as the application of
force, in some form, often including deadly force, is also a reality. The availability
of detention to soldiers in a conflict may tend to reduce the amount of force that
would otherwise be used to complete a mission: without detention available, the
soldier can either shoot to kill or let the targeted person run away to fight again to-
morrow. Detention is hardly cost-free, and its very availability can often lead to
abuses of the authority that allows it. The law regarding detention attempts to
strike the appropriate balance in often general terms, explicitly relying upon the
good faith of the parties in applying the law to facts on the ground.
The detention operations described in this article represent an evolution over
several years. They were characterized by an overall good-faith effort to apply the
letter and spirit of the law, but they were far from perfect. The damage caused by
Abu Ghraib is incalculable, but it focused command attention on detention opera-
tions and made incredible resources available to improve them, and so resulted in a
much better product. Procedures were developed and conscientiously applied, but
mistakes are likely in any system. Many were detained, and for too long, who did
not deserve to be detained. The process eventually found them, and they were re-
leased. Many were released who should not have been released, either through
oversight, failure to synthesize all available information or by misjudgments by the
reviewing board; some returned to the insurgency and killed coalition force mem-
bers or Iraqi citizens, and this too is a tragedy. Mistakes on either side are inevita-
ble; the best systems can only hope to minimize them.
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Appendix
(TF 134 Letterhead)
Reply to Attention of
MNFI-DCG-DO 5 August 2007
MEMORANDUM FOR MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE REVIEW COMMITTEE
MEMBERS
SUBJECT: Multi-National Force Review Committee Instructions
1. You have been selected for important duty as a member of the Multi-
National Force Review Committee (MNFRC). This duty is a critical part of the ef-
forts of the Multi-National Force, and vital to a measured and steady reintegration
of security internees back into Iraqi society. While assigned, this will be your pri-
mary duty, until your assignment ends. You should review this letter and other in-
structional material that will be made available to you prior to your first board.
2. The persons who appear before you are security detainees. We detain
them under the authority of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions
which permit us to hold those who present imperative threats to coalition forces or
the Iraqi people. Although in many cases their conduct could be characterized as
criminal, it is not necessary to our detention that they be charged with, or con-
victed of, a crime. Similarly, the detainees are not serving a sentence. Rather, they
are held because they have been determined to be security threats.
3. Your task is to determine whether the detainee remains an imperative
threat to security. You must believe that there are reasonable grounds to sustain
that finding. “Reasonable grounds” consist of sufficient indicators to lead a reason-
able person to believe that detention is necessary for imperative reasons of security.
4. You should consider the following factors in arriving at this
determination:
• Your focus should be on the threat the detainee presents today, not the
threat he posed when he was captured. Pre-capture conduct may be important
as an indicator of the detainee’s threat level now, and in the future, but it is not
the sole indicator. The detainee will have undergone several legal reviews prior to
appearing before you. You are in no way bound by their findings and
recommendations.
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• You will have access to classified and unclassified information associated
with the case. As you review the information, focus on facts, not on the
conclusions of others: it is your job to draw the conclusions.
• You should understand that time spent in the Theater Internment Facility
(TIF) can change a person—for good or for bad. It is your job to assess that
change, and apply it to your threat determination. In this regard, you will be
provided with a “report card” for each detainee. It will detail his performance in
the TIF, including: any disciplinary infractions; any instances of positive
performance; participation in educational classes, religious enlightenment
courses, or in various vocational training courses. Be aware that a detainee may
engage in negative or group behaviors in a prison-like environment for self-
preservation. You will be provided with various assessments of the detainee by
counselors, psychologists, and religious leaders. Take all of these items into
account when you make your decision.
• You will have the opportunity to question the detainee. Make use of it, but
be mindful of disclosing classified information, especially sources and methods of
collection. It is up to you to determine the detainee’s credibility, and what weight
you give his answers. Be aware that cultural differences may complicate this
challenge. A cultural advisor will be available to help you in this regard.
• Treat the detainee with respect. Show no bias to his regional or religious
background. Don’t be affected by his manner of dress or personal appearance.
Finally, remember that, although you will be participating in many of these
boards, he only gets to appear before this one, and your decision is going to have a
profound impact on his life.
5. At the conclusion of the hearing, you will be able to discuss the case with
your fellow members, and vote. Each member’s vote is equally weighted. Senior
members will not unduly influence junior members. You must decide first
whether the detainee is an imperative threat to security. If he is not, you should
vote to Release; if he is, you should vote to Retain. Majority rules. If the majority
votes to Retain, you next vote whether the detainee should be recommended for
participation in TIFRIC, or TIF Re-Integration Center. This program is described
more fully in information available to you, but is generally for those detainees
whom you feel will benefit from the suite of services offered on their way to even-
tual release. Again, majority rules.
6. If you have any questions about this duty, contact the TF 134 Legal Advi-
sor or his MNFRC Representative.
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7. Thank you for participating in this process. You are making a differ-
ence in our efforts to ensure the safety and stability of Iraq, and the success of the
Coalition Force mission.
/signed/
DOUGLAS M. STONE
Major General, USMC
Deputy Commanding General for
Detainee Operations
I hereby acknowledge receipt of these instructions and will comply with all of the
above:
_____________________________________
Signature and date
Notes
1. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersch, The Annals of National Security: Torture at Abu Ghraib,
THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/
05/10/040510fa_fact.
2. As will be discussed, though technically a coalition operation among many nations, the
primary actor, and in most cases the only actor, in the detention operations discussed in this arti-
cle was the United States. Nevertheless, since some aspects of the operation did involve the coali-
tion in the broader sense, the term “coalition forces” will be used as a shorthand.
3. Note that this article will not discuss the legal basis for initiating conflict, or jus ad bellum.
For such a discussion, see Andru E. Wall, Was the 2003 Invasion of Iraq Legal?, which is Chapter
IV in this volume, at 69.
4. See President George W. Bush, President Bush Addresses the Nation (Mar. 19, 2003),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html (announc-
ing that combat operations had begun in Iraq as of March 19, 2003, in Washington, DC, but
March 20 in Iraq due to the time difference).
5. Article 2 is common to all four Geneva Conventions. See Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Wounded and Sick Convention]; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Shipwrecked Convention];
Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter PW Convention]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civil-
ians Convention]; all reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts & Rich-
ard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) at 197, 198; 222, 223; 244, 245; and 301, 302; respectively.
Common Article 2 states: “[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties . . . .”
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6. See generally Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to
Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, re-
printed in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 73. See also Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR, supra note 5, at 422.
7. PW Convention, supra note 5, art. 4. The remaining categories of persons eligible for
prisoner of war status include armed forces of a government not recognized by the detaining
power, civilians accompanying the force, certain merchant mariners, and civilians comprising
mass levies. Id. For a discussion suggesting additional inferred conditions over the four enumer-
ated in the text, see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 36 (2004).
8. PW Convention, supra note 5, art. 118.
9. Id., art. 5.
10. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, Reg. 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Re-
tained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees (1997) [hereinafter AR 190-8]. AR
190-8 has applicability among all four US services: the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy have
each provided AR 190-8 a designation within their own systems of regulations.
11. PW Convention, supra note 5, art. 5 (emphasis added).
12. Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 4.
13. The exceptions from protected-person status include nationals of a country not a party
to the Convention, and nationals of neutral States in the territory of the detaining State, and
nationals of cobelligerents anywhere, so long as the neutral or cobelligerent State has normal
diplomatic relations with the detaining State. Id.
14. Part II is entitled “General Protection of Populations Against Certain Consequences of
War.” Id., Part II. The articles therein (Articles 13–26) generally protect hospitals, medical per-
sonnel and transports associated with the same, and encourage the parties to specially protect
certain vulnerable populations (expectant women, children, etc.). Id.
15. Like Article 2, Article 3 is common to all the Geneva Conventions. See Wounded and
Sick Convention, supra note 5, art. 3; Shipwrecked Convention, supra note 5, art. 3; PW Conven-
tion, supra note 5, art. 3; Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 3. Although by its terms Com-
mon Article 3 applies only to armed conflicts “not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,” the ICRC Commentary makes clear that these
same standards were intended to apply to all armed conflicts. The Commentary states:
The value of the provision [sub-paragraph (1) of Common Article 3] is not limited to
the field within Article 3. Representing, as it does, the minimum which must be applied
in the least determinate of conflicts, its terms must a fortiori be respected in
international armed conflicts proper, when all the provisions of the Convention are
applicable. For “the greater obligation must include the lesser,” as one might say.
COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF
WAR 38 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY].
16. Compare, e.g., Civilians Convention, supra note 5, Article 27 requirement of humane
treatment without adverse distinctions with a similar provision in Common Article 3, paragraph
1, id.; Article 32’s, id., prohibition of murder and torture with Common Article 3, id., paragraph
1(a); and Article 34’s, id., prohibition on the taking of hostages with Common Article 3, para-
graph 1(b), id.
17. Section II is entitled “Aliens in the Territory of a Party to the Conflict,” id.; Section III is
“Occupied Territories,” id.
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18. Although the Civilians Convention typically discusses internment along with assigned
residence, the focus of this article is only on internment, and therefore any references to assigned
residence will be henceforth disregarded.
19. Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 41. The text of the article is actually written to
make clear that nothing more severe than assigned residence or internment is possible; by clear
implication, assigned residence or internment is therefore permissible.
20. Id., art. 42.
21. Id., art. 43.
22. Id., art. 78. The ICRC Commentary suggests that the “imperative reasons of security”
standard of Article 78 is more stringent than the “absolutely necessary” standard of Article 42,
even though their colloquial meanings seem substantially equivalent. Comparing Article 78 to
Article 42, the Commentary states:
In occupied territories the internment of protected persons should be even more
exceptional than it is inside the territory of the Parties to the conflict; for in the former
case the question of nationality does not arise. That is why Article 78 speaks of
imperative reasons of security; there can be no question of taking collective measures:
each case must be decided separately.
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 367. The observation is resolved in the commentary to
Article 41: “[T]here might be situations—a threat of invasion for example—which would force a
government to act without delay to prevent hostile acts, and to take measures against certain
categories without always finding it possible to consider individual cases.” Id. at 256.
23. Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 78. In discussing the content of the “regular pro-
cedure” to be followed, the Commentary refers the reader to the “precise and detailed procedure
to be followed” set out in Article 43. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 368. However, the
promised detail is lacking both in the text of Article 43 and its accompanying commentary; both
are written at the same level of generality as Article 78. See Civilians Convention, supra note 5,
art. 43; ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 261.
24. Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 78.
25. Id.
26. Id. The commentary to Article 78 offers the observation that the reviewing body must be
more than a single individual. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 369. But see YORAM
DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 175 (2009), where Profes-
sor Dinstein discusses, approvingly, Israel’s decision to have Article 78 appeals decided by a sin-
gle judge.
27. See President George W. Bush, President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in
Iraq Have Ended (May 1, 2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2003/05/20030501-15.html.
28. “The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation . . . .” Civilians
Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, para. 2.
29. CPA Regulation No. 1, issued on May 16, 2003, is the means by which the CPA estab-
lished itself. Section 1 declared that “[t]he CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily
in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional ad-
ministration . . . .” “The CPA is vested with all executive, legislative, and judicial authority neces-
sary to achieve its objectives . . . .” Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, CPA/REG/
16 May 2003/01 (May 16, 2003), sec. 1, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/
20030516 _CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf.
30. CPA Regulation No. 1 states, “Regulations and Orders will remain in force until repealed
by the Administrator or superseded by legislation issued by democratic institutions of Iraq.” Id.,
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sec. 3(1). Throughout its existence, the CPA also issued various memoranda. These are defined
as interpretive guides to regulations and orders, id., sec. 4(1); as such, they cannot be considered
“law” in the same sense as regulations and orders.
31. S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
32. U.N. Charter chap. VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression).
33. S.C. Res 1511, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003), also a resolution under Chapter
VII, previously authorized “a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.” Id., para. 13.
34. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 31, para. 10.
35. Id. at 8.
36. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
37. The public statements of many Security Council representatives adverted to the impor-
tance of the explicit Iraqi request for assistance to their voting for the resolution. See Press Re-
lease, Security Council, Security Council Endorses Formation of Sovereign Interim Government
in Iraq; Welcomes End of Occupation by 30 June, Democratic Elections by January 2005, U.N.
Doc. SC/8117 (June 8, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8117
.doc.htm. Accordingly, the annexation of the Allawi letter to the resolution no doubt served a
political purpose.
38. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 31, para. 12.
39. S.C. Res. 1637, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov. 11, 2005).
40. S.C. Res. 1723, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006).
41. S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007).
42. Id.
43. See The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Iraq Declaration of Principles for Friendship and
Cooperation (Nov. 26, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2007/11/20071126-1.html. Among the principles contained in the declaration are
“Iraqis have expressed a desire to move past a Chapter VII MNFI mandate and we are committed
to helping them achieve this objective,” and “[a]fter the Chapter VII mandate is renewed for one
year, we will begin negotiation of a framework that will govern the future of our bilateral rela-
tionship.” Id.
44. For a more detailed treatment of the two agreements, see Trevor A. Rush, Don’t Call It a
SOFA!: An Overview of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, ARMY LAWYER, May 2009, at 34.
45. Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation
between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://
www.mnf-iraq.com/images/CGs_Messages/strategic_framework_agreement.pdf.
46. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the With-
drawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their
Temporary Presence in Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/
CGs_Messages/security_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Security Agreement].
47. See id., art. 22. See also Rush, supra note 44, at 42–46.
48. Security Agreement, supra note 46, art. 22.
49. The area of responsibility for Central Command included Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn
of Africa, Iran and Pakistan. See United States Central Command, AOR Countries, http://
www.centcom.mil/en/countries/aor/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2009). Needless to say, each of these
countries assigned to the commander of Central Command presented significant military
challenges.
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50. General Petraeus assumed the position of Commander, MNF-I, on February 10, 2007.
See Multi-National Force–Iraq, Petraeus Assumes MNF-I Command, http://www.mnf-
iraq.com (search “petraeus assumes command,” All Words option) (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
General Odierno assumed command on September 16, 2008. See Multi-National Force–Iraq,
Odierno Assumes Command of Coalition Forces in Iraq, http://www.mnf-iraq.com (search
“odierno assumes command,” All Words option) (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
51. The other major subordinate command, Multi-National Security Transition Command–
Iraq, was not involved in detention operations.
52. These were usually division commanders in their normally assigned, non-deployed billet.
53. Multi-National Force–West was the region commanded by a Marine Corps general, the
operating forces of which were predominantly, but not exclusively, Marines. The different
name—“Multi-National Force” versus “Division”—is the remnant of an earlier command rela-
tionship by which the Marine commander, then a three-star general, was independent of MNC-I
and reported directly to MNF-I.
54. As the Polish and British forces departed from Iraq, their areas of responsibility were as-
sumed by Multi-National Division–Central, which was re-designated as Multi-National
Division–South. See Multi-National Force–Iraq, MND-C, MND-SE Operating Areas Combine
to Create MND-South, http://www.mnf-iraq.com (search “mnd south british,” All Words op-
tion) (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
55. See Antonio M. Taguba, Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police
Brigade (certified on June 4, 2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report
.pdf [hereinafter Taguba Report]. General Taguba recommended “[t]hat a single commander in
CJTF-7 be responsible for overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater of Opera-
tions.” Id. at 21. CJTF-7 was the predecessor command to MNF-I.
56. The genesis of the name of the task force came simply from the name of the building—
Building 134 on Camp Victory—at which the task force was initially headquartered.
57. As will be seen below, the execution of the detention operation mission was overwhelm-
ingly more time consuming than that of creating policy. In recognition of that, all of the com-
mander’s staff resided in TF 134; there was no identified staff for the DCG-DO.
58. Operating units, such as divisions and brigades, would also operate small internment
facilities, at which detainees would be held for a limited period of time before being transferred
to the theater internment facility. The operations at the lower-level facilities are not the focus of
this article.
59. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-19.40, Internment/Resettlement Opera-
tions para. 3-12 (Sept. 4, 2007). In accordance with US Department of Defense, Directive
2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program para. 1.2 (Sept. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231001p.pdf [hereinafter DoDD 2310.01E], the
Secretary of the Army is designated the Executive Agent for Detention Operations. As such, doc-
trinal publications such as FM 3-19.40 have applicability across service lines.
60. TF 134 benefited from having both active-duty brigade elements, commanded by a colo-
nel (O-6), and reserve or National Guard units, commanded by brigadier generals (O-7).
61. One of the consequences of the extensive detention operation missions in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan was that active-duty MP units were heavily stressed, and therefore in short supply.
62. For example, Navy provisional units might be made up of aviation mechanics, sonarmen
or boatswain’s mates, and be commanded by a surface warfare officer. All were individual
augmentees, who would form into units in the United States, train for a period of time, deploy
and then upon redeployment return to their original units.
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63. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Opera-
tions para. 6-13 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/civ_liberties/Field_Manual
_Sept06.pdf [hereinafter FM 2-22.3].
64. Id., para. 3-24.
65. FM 2-22.3, supra note 63.
66. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Div. A, Title X, § 1002, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat.
2680 (codified at 10 U.S.C.S. § 801 Note (LexisNexis 2009)) [hereinafter DTA]. The Act pro-
vides: “No person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or
under detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or tech-
nique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on
Intelligence Interrogation.” Id., § 1002(a). In essence, the DTA “enacted” certain portions of FM
2-22.3, supra note 63, into positive law. The decision was welcomed by many as a means of pro-
viding transparency to interrogation operations, and criticized by others on constitutional
grounds or the practical ground that by limiting interrogation methods to those publicly dissem-
inated, potential enemies may benefit by developing effective resistance techniques. See James A.
Barkei, Legislating Military Doctrine: Congressional Usurping of Executive Authority Through
Detainee Interrogations, 193 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 97 (2007) (arguing that the DTA
impermissibly intrudes upon the President’s powers).
67. FM 2-22.3, supra note 63, chap. 8.
68. Id., para. 5-75.
69. As a participant in many briefings to distinguished visitors, among them congressional
leaders and Department of Defense officials, at TF 134, this author heard many questions about
the effect of the Detainee Treatment Act/FM 2-22.3 scheme. The JIDC commander and his head
interrogator always responded that they supported the policy and believed that it did not ad-
versely affect their ability to harvest useful intelligence.
70. This position was another result of the recommendations of General Taguba. See Taguba
Report, supra note 55, at 21, where it was recommended “[t]hat it is critical that the proponent
for detainee operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training
and knowledge of international and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of detainee
operations.”
71. It is argued that human rights law is equally applicable and binding to the detention op-
erations in Iraq conducted by the United States. For purposes of this article the author will sim-
ply espouse the US government position that human rights law did not apply.
72. DoDD 2310.01E, supra note 59.
73. Id., para. 4.1.
74. Id., para. 4.2.
75. Id., para. 4.8.
76. Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 3 (Revised), Criminal Procedures,
CPA/MEM/27 June 2004/03 (June 27, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/
20040627_CPAMEMO_3_Criminal_Procedures__Rev_.pdf [hereinafter CPA Memo 3].
77. Id., sec. 4.1.
78. Id., sec. 4.2.
79. Id., sec. 4.3.
80. US Central Command promulgated its orders in many areas, to include those applicable
to detention operations, as Fragmentary Orders (or FRAGOs), in recognition that the FRAGO
modified a previously issued overarching order. The FRAGOs changed with some regularity
and, more important, were always classified, so they defy easy citation. The general provisions
discussed here, however, are unclassified.
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81. MNF-I issued its order in this area in memorandum form. Like the Central Command
FRAGOs, the memorandum order was classified, and citation to it, even if possible, would not be
helpful.
82. See infra Part II.C.4.
83. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 31, merely puts forth the standard of “imperative reasons of
security,” echoing the same language in Article 78, Civilians Convention, supra note 5. The ICRC
Commentary makes it clear that it should be a high standard, but struggles to provide further co-
herent guidance as to its meaning. Internment under Article 78 is said to be “even more excep-
tional” than that under Articles 41 and 42, though only in the sense that internment must be
applied individually as opposed to collectively. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 367. See
discussion, supra, in note 22. In a comment to Article 42, it is offered that in order to intern “the
State must have good reason to think that the person concerned, by his activities, knowledge or
qualifications, represents a real threat to its present or future security.” The footnote to this as-
sertion reads: “The fact that a man is of military age should not necessarily be considered as justi-
fying the application of these measures, unless there is a danger of him being able to join the
enemy armed forces.” Id. at 258. The Commentary raises as many questions as its solves. Intern-
ing a person for his “activities” is straightforward, and is the normal basis on which detention
would depend. “Knowledge” and “qualifications” are less clear: is it possible to intern a person
for merely knowing how to make or emplace an IED? And what to make of the footnote regard-
ing those of military age? It begins by saying that being of military age is not a reason for intern-
ment, but then says that it can be such a reason if there is a danger of the person being able to join
the opposing force, regardless of any intention of doing so. Other commentators have also strug-
gled with the quality of the standard. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 173 (citing various Is-
raeli court cases construing the “imperative threat” standard, revealing only different verbal
formulations, with little additional specificity); Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in
Armed Conflict, 40 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 403, 406 (noting
only that Article 78 establishes a “high” standard, representing a balance between the needs of the
State for security and individual liberty).
84. TF 134 owned two camps containing TIFs. Camp Cropper is the facility through which
every detainee first passed. It was at Camp Cropper that all administrative processing and initial
interrogations would be conducted. Some detainees would remain at Camp Cropper; others
would be sent to Camp Bucca in southern Iraq close to the border with Kuwait. Camp Bucca was
built solely for the purpose of holding detainees. It was administratively subdivided into two and
then three individual TIFs, mostly for the purpose of command and control, but for this paper, it
will be treated as a single facility.
85. Victory Base Complex surrounds Baghdad International Airport and extended to most
of the area that was known as the Al Faw Palace complex. This is a different area from the Inter-
national Zone, popularly known as the “Green Zone,” which comprises an area on the western
bank of the Euphrates River. The US Embassy is located in the International Zone; first housed in
Saddam Hussein’s former presidential palace, it has since moved to a new building elsewhere in
the zone. Certain of the review boards discussed later were conducted in the International Zone.
Victory Base Complex and the International Zone are separated by approximately seven miles.
To get from one to the other required either a military convoy or a helicopter flight.
86. See DoDD 2310.01E, supra note 59, para. 4.4.1.
87. As will be evident throughout this article, detainee operations are neither premised upon
nor necessarily directed toward successful criminal prosecution. Soldiers are not criminal inves-
tigators and the uncertain security situation rarely permitted any forensic exploitation of the
capture site. To take the clearest case, detainees would often be found in possession of dangerous
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weapons; after taking pictures of them, the weapons were usually destroyed in the field in the in-
terest of safety and force protection.
88. See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
89. See discussion infra Part II.C.4.
90. The unit would maintain the information permitting a correlation between the assigned
number and the informant’s actual identity.
91. See FM 2-22.3, supra note 63, at 6-10, for a discussion of the “rating” system used to as-
sess cooperation and knowledge of detainees or other informants.
92. See David Dyzenhaus, Symposium: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty: The Grudge Informer
Case Revisited, 83 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1000 (2008).
93. An anecdote might be helpful. Detainee A was picked up and held on the strength of the
statement of a neighbor that implicated Detainee A in various insurgent activities. Detainee A
later claimed, truthfully in the eyes of the board which voted for his release, that he was feuding
with this neighbor because he (Detainee A) had accused the neighbor’s daughter of immoral be-
havior. Detainee B, whose case happened to come up for review at the same time, was also the
victim of the same neighbor’s complaints; in this case, Detainee B stated he had complained to
the authorities that the neighbor was running a bordello, after which he was detained by coali-
tion forces. Detainee B was also voted for release. Although the results in each of these cases may
have been release if viewed individually, the happenstance of them both being reviewed at the
same time made the truth clearer.
94. See CPA Memo 3, supra note 76, sec. 4.2. It was generally assumed that the Magistrate
Cell review was the review required by the guidance, though an argument could be made that the
review at the brigade level by the commander and his staff complied with the requirement.
95. The detainee did not appear before the magistrate. See the discussion in Part III, infra,
about efforts made to explore the possibility of detainee involvement at this stage.
96. See discussion, infra Part II.C.6, on the process followed for criminal prosecutions.
97. All correspondence was delivered by a TF 134 organization called the Detainee Assis-
tance Center. Minimally staffed with an attorney or two, as many paralegals, and several inter-
preters, its main task was to answer any questions the detainees had about their legal situations.
98. Article 78 required that the detention procedure “shall include a right of appeal for the
parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay.” Civilians Convention,
supra note 5, art. 78. CPA Memo 3 did not include a requirement for an appeal; the six-month re-
view was the first required review subsequent to the initial seven-day review. CPA Memo 3, supra
note 76, sec. 6. The ninety-day review was clearly established in written guidance and actual prac-
tice by 2007, but its genesis is unclear.
99. Certainly detainee disturbances were not caused solely by the review system utilized,
though it was a contributing factor. An additional factor was the work of detainee provocateurs,
generally identified as extremists, who continued to carry on the insurgency from within the in-
ternment facilities.
100. PW Convention, supra note 5, art. 5.
101. AR 190-8, supra note 10, para. 1-6, entitled “Tribunals.”
102. This was one of the divergences from AR 190-8 (the other was that no written record,
aside from the written voting sheet, was prepared). AR 190-8 states that all members are to be
commissioned officers. Id. The decision was that senior enlisted personnel, with their significant
military experience and maturity, would often be better members than would very junior officers.
In other military administrative boards, such as boards to administratively separate members from
the service, the three-member panel may include a senior enlisted member; see, e.g., Headquar-
ters, Department of the Army, Reg. 635-200, Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations
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para. 2-7.a (June 6, 2005); Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, Naval Military
Personnel Manual art. 1910-502 (June 21, 2008). A less principled reason was the need to in-
crease the pool of members from which TF 134 drew.
103. The text of the “Instructions to Members” is included as an appendix, infra.
104. I offer no claim here that these hearings were contests among equals. The military
detainers had many resources to draw upon to collect evidence, while the detainee often had little
more in his defense than his own statement and answers to questions.
105. Common to any operation which relied upon interpreters, the quality of the interpreta-
tion provided could only be assessed by other interpreters, whose own proficiency could be as
questionable.
106. As the DCG-DO was exercising delegated power from MNF-I, the Commanding Gen-
eral, MNF-I, also had the power to order a release, which he exercised occasionally.
107. Admittedly, neither the text to either of the articles nor the Commentary specifically
makes these a requirement. See Civilians Convention, supra note 5, arts. 43, 78; ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 260, 368. The ICRC’s position was based more on practical real-
ities. For a board to be fair, it had to be able to arrive at an independent decision. For a board to be
worthwhile, it had to have a final effect and not be merely recommendatory.
108. This is hardly a legal argument. Rather, it is a concession to the need to relieve some of
the natural tension that exists between the operating forces which capture and detain persons
and an organization such as TF 134 charged with holding, and releasing, those same detainees. In
very general terms, the operating forces would prefer that no detainees were released: they were
threats when captured, and would be threats again if released. It is too easy, in their view, for gar-
rison-based organizations, such as TF 134, to release detainees, because they aren’t likely to en-
counter them again on the street. Having a general officer make the final decision reduced some
amount of the public recrimination.
109. The process followed was this: every MNFRC release recommendation was vetted
through the capturing unit for comment. If the capturing unit had no comment or objection, the
release would be approved. If the unit objected, it was required to provide additional informa-
tion about the detainee that might not have been available in the file. Once received, the detainee
would appear before a second MNFRC, which had the benefit of the new evidence. This second
board (which, in the mania for acronyms, was called the P-MNFRC, for Post-MNFRC) was un-
constrained by the results of the first, and its new recommendation would be followed in the
same manner as a regular MNFRC.
110. No boards were held on Friday, the Islamic holy day. The MNFRC work week began on
Saturday.
111. The rates provided here are rough averages and reflect the trend of the data reported
to the DCG-DO, who reported it in turn to MNF-I. The actual data are now unavailable and
irretrievable.
112. CPA Memo 3, in the section discussing security internment, stated: “Any person under
the age of 18 interned at any time shall in all cases be released not later than twelve months after
the initial date of internment.” CPA Memo 3, supra note 76, sec. 6.5. Determining a detainee’s
age was often difficult, as many did not know their birthdates, and documentation was rarely
available. Those under age eighteen who had been detained for one year were released with no
other process necessary. Those who turned eighteen while in custody did not, TF 134 reasoned,
benefit from the CPA Memo 3 provision, and their detentions continued until they were other-
wise released.
113. See Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Mili-
tary Departments et al., Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for
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Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (July 14, 2006) (Encl. 3,
Personal Representatives Qualifications, Roles and Responsibilities), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
114. TF 134 held several hundred juveniles, though because of the ability to hold them for
only one year, they appeared usually only once each before an MNFRC. See discussion supra note
112. There were usually fewer than two hundred third-country national detainees, and female
detainees never exceeded twenty at any one time, and were usually fewer than five. There was no
established method for identifying those with diminished mental capacity. The medical com-
mand planned at one time to screen every detainee for mental ability for its own treatment pur-
poses. TF 134 would have used whatever list they provided, but little came of it. Identification of
those in this last category was therefore ad hoc. Because of the limited numbers, only two per-
sonal representatives were necessary at a time: one at Camp Cropper, where all juveniles and fe-
males were held, and one at Camp Bucca for anyone else.
115. Early in his tenure as DCG-DO, which began in May 2007, General Stone had a vision of
moving away from the warehouse model used at Camp Bucca to smaller, regionally based TIFs.
These would be designed and built as TIFs first and foremost, but with facilities to permit the ser-
vices discussed in the text. Initially denominated as TIF Re-Integration Centers (TIFRIC), the
name was later changed to TIFRC. Two TIFRCs were planned, one in Ramadi in western Iraq,
and one in Taji, just north of Baghdad; only Taji was completed in late 2008. While awaiting
these facilities, Camps Cropper and Bucca TIFs were reconfigured to offer the same services, so
that they became TIFRCs in the same sense.
116. Naming the religious component proved very difficult. It could not appear to be the US
government encouraging religion from the point of view of a US audience nor the United States
“teaching” Islam to an Iraqi audience. Religious “engagement” was chosen as a somewhat neu-
tral term.
117. When large-scale requests were received, it was impractical to consider each individual
as described in the text. For example, it was not unusual to receive a list of ISNs from Iraqi offi-
cials that ran into the hundreds of detainees. In those cases, the cases would be sent immediately
to an out-of-cycle MNFRC; the members were made aware of the reason for the special hearing.
The results of the MNFRC would then substitute for the recommendation usually made by the
special release attorney for the DCG-DO’s decision on release.
118. One of the consequences of regular unit rotations through the theater was that successor
units often had little information about “their” detainees (in the sense that the detainees had
been captured in, and would return to, their areas of operation). Departing units would some-
times box up all detainee files and bring them back with them to their home bases in the United
States or elsewhere; sometimes they would be stored in a warehouse on a base in Iraq with no
easy means of retrieving individual files. It would occasionally happen that a unit would ask for
the release of a detainee about whom it had little information, and when more fully acquainted
with the facts underlying the original detention, it withdrew its request.
119. CPA Memo 3, supra note 76, sec. 5.1.
120. Id., sec. 6.1.
121. For a more detailed description of the procedures used in criminal prosecutions by authors
who were assigned to TF 134, see Michael J. Frank, Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the
Central Criminal Court of Iraq, 18 FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2006); W. James
Annexstad, The Detention and Prosecution of Insurgents and Other Non-Traditional Combatants—A
Look at the Task Force 134 Process and the Future of Detainee Prosecutions, ARMY LAWYER, July
2007, at 72.
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122. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 13 (Revised)(Amended), The Central Crimi-
nal Court of Iraq, CPA/ORD/X 2004/13 (Apr. 22, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
regulations/20040422_CPAORD_13_Revised_Amended.pdf.
123. Id., sec. 18.
124. The MNFRC was designed, in part, to address detainee discontent. See discussion supra
note 99 and accompanying text. The MNFRC largely fulfilled its promise, and was often credited,
by the DCG-DO and other officials, with being the single biggest factor in subsequent TIF “calm-
ing.” Detainees finally saw that reviews were ongoing, and participated in the hearing of their
own cases. Increased numbers of detainees were being released. As time went on, the calming ef-
fect dissipated, for there were detainees who appeared before MNFRC and yet were not being re-
leased. Had the MNFRC simply been ended, and the CRRB reinstituted, we could have expected
much worse.
125. A species of this worked successfully at CCCI. Those US service members who were wit-
nesses in a CCCI case, but who had rotated back to the United States, were permitted to testify
before the investigative judge via video teleconference.
126. Two anecdotes may help illustrate the point. General Petraeus observed an MNFRC at
Camp Bucca several months after they had begun running. He sat in on a case in which the de-
tainee was alleged to have been involved with an IED attack on coalition force soldiers. After the
explosion the soldiers traced the wire used to initiate the IED to the house in which they found
the detainee. General Petraeus sat through the entire hearing and remained—quietly—as the
members deliberated. Unanimously they provisionally voted to retain. General Petraeus got up
to leave, and said something to the effect of “If I was voting, I would vote to release” and left. Two
of the members—the two officers—then changed their votes. The sole enlisted member stood
his ground; that is why they are invaluable to a process such as this. The other anecdote relates to
comments members would make at the conclusion of their service on the MNFRC. Senior en-
listed members would often say that they were going to go back to their units and make sure they
did things correctly in the future, and were able to do so in a way that officers cannot.
127. As with many matters discussed, this is a recommendation based on practicalities, not
the law. In the abstract, detainees should be released or detained based solely on the quality of the
evidence; the operating forces, in a military hierarchy, must acknowledge that. Nevertheless, it
must be recognized that the operating force’s lack of acceptance of the process can ultimately
frustrate the entire effort. A process in which they are given a voice may avoid that result.
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